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Today, the relationships between Africa and Japan,
whether they are government-to-government or private
sector, are truly wide ranging. This can be surmised by
observing the number of embassies that Japan and the
nations of Africa have opened in each other's countries. Just
by looking at the number of agreements and treaties that
have been entered into between the two, one can see that
the diplomatic ties have deepened. The people of Africa live
in an age of changing nation states and politics, and the polit
ical and diplomatic actors have become truly diverse.
What is contemporary Africa seeking by entering into reia-
tionships with Japan? How should Japan approach the ever-
changing socio-political circumstances in Africa? What
common goals should they set for building future relation
ships? This paper attempts to answer these questions by
examining the following topics: (1) charting the basic frame
work of Japanese diplomacy with the nations of Africa; (2)
reviewing the changes in Japan's relationships with the
nations of Africa during the Cold War Era; (3) examining rela
tions between Africa and Japan in the post-Cold War period,
specifically focusing on the Tokyo International Conference
on African Development (TICAD) process; and (4) consid
ering what the common challenges are in building sustain
able relationships between Africa and Japan in the new
century.
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1. Basic Framework of African-Japanese Reiations
(1) Basic Framework of Newly Emerging African Nations'
Reiations with Japan
In the late 1950s and 1960s, many African nations, burning with the
desire to build new nation states, became independent. For many, the
process of independence continues today. Common challenges for
African nations include forming a nation state, breaking away from
colonial economies, restoring human dignity, and taking their due place
in the international community. It can be said that African-Japanese
relations have been formed under the political actions of African nations
striving to overcome challenges such as these. In the course of doing
so, there are a number of factors that have had an impact on relations
between the two.
It goes without saying that the main players are the state govern
ments. Consequently, the basis of African diplomacy has been bilat
eral, taking place between the various nations within the African conti
nent and countries outside the African continent. The nations of Africa
share a common past in that they were colonized. Whether the previous
colonial masters were good or bad, they served as a type of 'reference
society' as the African countries built independent nation states and
formed external relations. In the course of forming these relationships,
some African nations did develop bilateral diplomacy individually.
However, in the case of former French territories, a special relationship
has been maintained, officially known as the Central African Franc
(CFA) zone. The 14 nations of Central Africa, which historically have
had deep ties with France, have also formed regional cooperative orga
nizations: the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)
and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC).
Similarly, the nations that are former British territories have maintained
relationships with the former colonial power Britain and conduct diplo
macy in a forum called the Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting (CHOGM). In addition, regional cooperative organisations
such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have been
formed.
In contrast, under the Pan Africanism advocated by Kwame
Nkrumah, independent African nations have cooperated on a conti
nental level to build relationships with nations outside of Africa. For
example, although there were differences between the radical
Casablanca Group and the moderate Monrovia Group, the Organization
of African Unity (GAU) was established in 1963, and the concept of
'One Continent, One Destiny' has been maintained to this day. This
spirit has also been inherited by the African Union (AU). After indepen
dence and during the Cold War Period, the newly emerged nations of
Africa adopted a clear stance that they did not belong to either the
Eastern socialist camp or the Western liberal camp, joining the non-
aligned movement. They also cooperated with each other and
conducted diplomacy in international arenas, such as the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), which takes place
at the United Nations (UN), to deal with and reform the existing interna
tional system. (Gordon and Gordon 2013)
As described above, the political relationships between Africa and
Japan were formed bilaterally, with continental organisations as well as
with regional cooperatives; through international movements and
organisations, and so on.
(2) Basic Framework of Post War Japanese Relations with Africa
In 1952, Japan had regained its sovereignty, but was still carrying
the experience of defeat from the war. Thus, Japan's post-WWII diplo
macy took the path of pacifism, antinationalism, and passive coopera
tion with the international environment, using the United States as a
model 'reference society'. At the time, Japan's top priorities with regard
to foreign policy were sustained economic growth, minimal defence
spending, and the alliance with the US. Since the formation of the two-
party system in 1955, in which the conservative parties merged, three
cooperative principles became clear, advocating liberalism, Asia
centrism, and UN centrism. Japan's Africa policy was defined by these
interconnected elements, the specific aspects of which were: Japan's
economic needs, a Japan-US Security Treaty, and political awareness
about Japan's international standing and role, (lokibe 2006)
The fact that Japan emerged as an industrial nation after WWII and
showed a strong interest in increasing exports and securing sources of
raw materials hastened the establishment of diplomatic relations with
African nations. However, the expansion of trade relations between
Japan and Africa was hindered by the influence of the former colonial
powers over the African nations and the invocation of trade restrictions
in Article 35 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In
order to resolve such issues, the Japanese government made an effort
to build friendly relations with Africa, largely through the use of develop
ment assistance. As Japan accumulated payment surpluses and the
Japanese economy grew rapidly, Japan was able to start assistance
programs, and contributed to the formation of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAG) at the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961. (Engel and Olsen
2005)
The Japan-US Security Treaty was another reason Japan became
involved in Africa. Japan's role of supplementing and reinforcing US
strategic interests became an important element of its foreign policy. As
a result, Japan's Africa policy during the Cold War took the form of
following US initiatives in Africa. (Morikawa 1997)
The final element that defined Japan's relationship with Africa was
the fact that Japan, as an industrial nation, sought a commensurate
role and standing in international society. Since joining the UN in
December 1956, Japan had tried to use international organisations to
resolve issues in a manner commensurate with its economic standing.
In doing so, Japan made efforts to gain favour with African nations in
order to gain recognition at the UN and other international forums.
(Alger, Lyons and Trent 1995)
2. Chronology of African-Japanese Relations during the Cold
War Period
(1) Africa under the Development Plans and Japan Pursuing
Trade and investment Opportunities (1960 to 1973)
With the establishment of diplomatic relations with African nations,
Japan expected to be able to expand trade and investment opportuni
ties. For the African nations, there was the hope that securing markets
for agricultural produce and raw materials, and the income that would
be obtained as a result, would promote industrialisation and economic
growth.
In the 1960s, Japan's industrial production grew In leaps and bounds
and the market share of Japanese goods in international markets also
increased. The Japanese government was seeking the possibility of
securing sources of raw materials for industrial use from Africa as well.
In 1965, imports of Zambian copper ore increased, and in 1967, Japan
entered into a copper ore development agreement with Zaire, and with
Uganda as well. Japan invested large amounts of money in the extrac
tion industry, particularly in South Africa under the apartheid regime, in
order to obtain strategic mineral resources such as coal, chrome,
manganese, vanadium, and platinum.
There were two aspects to Japan's strategy for the newly indepen
dent African nations: to establish friendly relationships with Kenya and
Tanzania—non-aligned nations who were influential on the pro-West
side—and to strengthen ties with mineral resource supplier nations
including Gabon, Nigeria, Zaire, and Zambia. When an African nation
became independent, Japan quickly established diplomatic relations
and, after negotiations, entered into long-term agreements for the
supply of raw materials. These friendly relations were useful in opening
up new markets for Japanese products in African nations, which were
striving to stimulate economic growth. Although the value of exports of
industrial goods to Africa continued to rise, the value of imports from
Africa remained small, creating a trade imbalance. African nations,
increasingly concerned about a blowout in the trade deficit, invoked
Article 35 of GATT, which stipulates the non-application of the agree
ment between particular nations. Trade missions were dispatched from
Japan to Africa to address the trade imbalance. (MOF 1963, 1972)
(2) Japan's Pursuit of Resource Security and Africa's Criticism of
Japan (1974 to 1979)
The oil shock of October 1973 had a serious impact on the world
economy, and Africa was no exception. Economic growth rates fell and
per capita income also stagnated. The cost of energy and raw mate
rials went up, sparking inflation while simultaneously triggering reces
sion. Demand for African-produced petroleum also ebbed and there
was no growth in exports. African nations tried to pull through the
current deficit using borrowings of private sector money and aid from
foreign countries.
Meanwhile, the Japanese government changed its national security
objectives to secure a stable supply of resources. Cheap petroleum
was the wellhead of economic growth and fundamental to the Japanese
economy. The cutback of oil supplies by Arab nations triggered the
Tokyo stock market collapse and a state of emergency was declared.
In December 1973, the Arab nations' oil supplies recovered, and Japan
had learnt a difficult lesson. As a result, Japan sought alternative
sources of supply for the strategic mineral resources and energy essen
tial for its industrial production. Of the African nations, Japan focused
particularly on crude oil from the Congo (Brazzaville), Niger, Nigeria,
and Zaire, and uranium from Namibia. (MOF 1977)
In January 1974, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka relaxed the condi
tions on Japanese aid and loans. As a result, the proportion of aid to
Africa that was from Japan rose. In addition, a preferential tariff scheme
was introduced and tariffs on African goods were lowered. As a result,
African exports to Japan increased. By 1982, Japan had become South
Africa's second most important trading partner. However, this drew
heightened criticism of Japan by other African nations on account of
South Africa's apartheid policy. But since South Africa had become
such an indispensible source of minerai resources, Japan was not
prepared to Jeopardise its economic relationship with South Africa,
even despite the fact that UN economic sanctions had been imposed.
In October 1974, Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura, in a bid to blunt
such criticism, made a historic visit to Africa, the first by a Japanese
Foreign Minister. In July 1979, Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda visited
the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania. These visits
deepened Japan's understanding of Africa's process of independence
from colonialism and the anti-apartheid struggle and demonstrated
Japan's intent to promote friendly relationships with African nations.
(Engel and Olsen 2005, Mangala 2011)
(3) African Poverty and Increasing Amounts of Aid from Japan
(1980 to 1992)
Around 1980, African nations went into a serious economic slump
recording negative growth. The second oil shock of 1978-79 and the
US high-interest rate policy had triggered a global recession. African
nations were hit hard by deteriorating terms of trade, falling exports.
and rising interest rates on foreign debt. In 1984, there was also a
drought across much of Africa, which took its toll on agricultural produc
tion. Moreover, in the early 1980s, the key donor nations, such as the
UK and the US, cut their aid budgets. For the African nations, external
assistance was essential to ride out their economic woes, so, in
exchange for assistance. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) intro
duced Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). This was also the
period in which the US was pressing Japan to reduce its trade surplus.
While the US was pressing Japan to take its fair share of the Western
collective security burden, it was simultaneously calling for the Japanese
government to increase the amount of aid it extended to Africa to deal
with the trade surplus and to alleviate the negative results of structural
adjustment programs. (MOFA D/p/omaf/c Blue Book 1981, Koppel and
Orr 1993)
Driven by the recommendations of its comprehensive security
cabinet meeting to maintain the US-Japan relationship and to deal with
IFIs'Africa projects, the Japanese government decided to increase the
amount of aid it gave to Africa. In doing so, the formative principles for
Japan's aid policy became the 'development of developing nations' and
'humanitarian assistance'. Policy ideals changed from 'pursuit of the
national interest' to 'promoting socio-economic stability and global
peace'. This indicated that Japan was on the verge of being able to be
directly involved with Africa. This direction is evident in the fact that
Japan was proactively involved in the debate that led to the adoption of
the Declaration on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa at the 1984
UN General Assembly. In fact, Japan was the only country that extended
a substantial amount of financial assistance for the structural adjust
ment programs and special loans to deal with Africa's economic crisis.
In this way, from the mid-1980s, Japan's new policies towards Africa
reflected the fact that Japan beginning to play a role in the international
community commensurate with that of an 'economic superpower'.
(MOFA D/p/omaf/c Blue Book 1992, Stein 1998, OECF 1989)
3. Africa and Japan in the Post-Coid War Period—^The New
Partnership for Africa's Deveiopment (NEPAD) and TiCAD
(1) Africa's Economic Recovery and Japan's Active invoivement
For Japan, which had adopted a foreign policy that conformed to the
post-WWII world order, the end of the Cold War and the aftermath of
the first Gulf War meant that Japan had to review its policy goals and
how they were pursued. Japan began to redefine the concept of
comprehensive security. The Official Development Assistance (ODA)
Charter was drafted in June of 1993. Japan's affirmations included
observance of the principal of democracy and basic human needs, the
promotion of economic development, and cutting military spending and
arms transfers. International peace and stability were made the focal
point for Japan's own wellbeing and international relations. (Engel and
Olsen 2005)
The end of the Cold War took away Africa's strategic importance
and the nations of the West abandoned policies of intervening in the
internal affairs of African nations. African nations were left to deal with
the failure of the structural adjustment programmes and the political
changes that occurred as a result. In the first half of the 1990s, new
leaders came on the scene in Africa and nations began trying to achieve
political stability, democracy, and economic recovery through their own
efforts.
Amidst this situation, Japan emerged as the only nation state
prepared to raise its level of aid to Africa and was therefore able to
exert influence over political and economic changes. In addition, Japan
tried to transform relations with Africa by developing a pro-active
agenda. The most notable initiative in this process was the Partnership
for Democratic Development (FDD). Under this initiative, institutional
support is given to various sectors of African nations, such as law,
administration, elections, and mass media.
It was necessary for Japan to participate in the UN's Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO) in order to play an international role commensurate
with its economic might and receive recognition. Japan began partici
pating in the PKO by contributing personnel to the United Nations
Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) in May 1993. Following this,
Japan sent personnel to the International Peace Cooperation Corps in
Rwanda to assist with delimiting the border between Ethiopia and
Eritrea, and contributed to disarmament in Sierra Leone. (Lehman
2010)
One of Japan's contributions to Africa is the fact that through jointly
holding high-level meetings it became involved in the prevention and
resolution of African conflicts. Examples of this are the 1995 and 1996
conferences held in Tokyo: "Peace and Development—^the Issues
around Conflicts in Africa" and "Conflicts in Africa—^the Road to Nation
Building in the Post-Conflict Period", respectively. Japan has supported
humanitarian activities and refugee relief activities through the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). In
addition to providing material support and financial assistance to UN
organisations, Japan also contributes to the eradication of HIV/AIDS,
polio, and malaria through the US-Japan Common Agenda.
Since The East Asia Miracle was published in 1993, Japan, together
with newly developing Asian nations, has tried to promote the Asian
development model to reduce poverty through economic growth as a
key strategy for African socio-economic development. Japan has driven
this initiative by supporting workshops in various regions across Africa,
encouraging economic development based on the experiences of Asia,
and promoting Asia-Africa cooperation. It is hoped that such institutions
will form the foundation for establishing South-South cooperation and
will also bring the experiences of developing Asian nations to Africa,
with Japan providing the necessary expertise, capital, and logistics, to
make the transition process easier. (Engel and Risen 2005)
(2) Birth of the New Partnership for African Deveiopment
(NEPAD)
In the 1990s, the new leaders who emerged as a result of demo
cratic elections started to think about strategies for Africa to develop by
its own hand. For example. South Africa's President Mbeki advocated
an 'African Renaissance' to rejuvenate Africa for the purpose of
economic recovery and democratization in Africa. This thinking took
shape in the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) in 2000. Similarly,
in Senegal, at President Wade's initiative, the 'Omega Plan' was formu
lated to put in place and maintain an African economic development
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infrastructure.
The MAP and Omega Plan were integrated and, in July 2001, the
New African Initiative (NAI) was adopted at the 37th session of the
GAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. NAI was renamed
New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) in October of that
same year. At the G8 Genoa Summit in 2001, the African heads of state
sought support from the international community in order to implement
NEPAD. The G8 developed nations welcomed NEPAD's adoption of
the Genoa Plan for Africa, and the Africa Action Plan was adopted at
the Kananaskis Summit. These events verify the fact that NEPAD
obtained the support of the international community.
The preconditions for African development, such as peace, democ
racy, human rights, and good governance, as well as the actions that
African nations should aim for and the goals they should achieve, are
clearly specified in NEPAD. NEPAD's action plan had the cooperation
of the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa (EGA) and was put together by a
steering committee made up of the five nations that played a leading
role: South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, and Egypt. What is worth
noting in the implementation of NEPAD is the introduction of a peer
review mechanism. The purpose of this was to promote the adoption of
policies that would be useful in making progress with politicai stability,
sustainable development, and economic integration and to improve
governance by allowing African nations to monitor each other's imple
mentation of NEPAD. (Obayashi 1999, 2003)
The developed nations drafted the G8 Africa Action Plan in response
to the voluntary actions and self-help efforts of African nations. 'Selective
implementation of aid' was adopted in this action plan to enhance
support for African nations achieving results based on the idea of
'enhanced partnerships'. Japan had already incorporated selective
implementation of aid into its Africa policy based on the various princi-
pies of its ODA Guidelines. The development philosophy of ownership
by the African nations and partnership with the international community
is common to NEPAD, the G8 Action Plan, and the TICAD process
promoted by Japan. (Lumumba-Kasongo 2010, Kawabata 2003, 2006,
2012)
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(3) Tokyo International Conference on African Development
(TICAD)
The TICAD process began when Western nations began to focus
on incorporating Eastern countries into the post-Coid War market
economy because it was gradually becoming apparent that aid to Africa
was not getting results. TICAD i was held on 5-6 October 1993, and
was attended by participants from 48 African nations, 13 donor nations,
10 international organizations, and more than 45 observer nations and
organisations, including non-government organisations (NGOs). TICAD
11 was held from 19-21 October 1998. Representatives from 80 coun
tries attended, including 13 heads of donor countries, accompanied by
other senior government officials, representatives from 40 international
organisations and private-sector organisations, and representatives
from 22 NGOs. Five years later, TICAD III was held from 29 September
to 1 October 2003, and was attended by 50 African nations, 47 regional
and international organisations, and many NGOs. Then from 28-30
May 2008, TICAD IV was held in Yokohama and was attended by
representatives of 51 African nations, including 41 heads of state, 34
development partner nations and Asian nations, and representatives of
international organisations. A summary of each of the TICAD confer
ences is given below.
(a) TICAD I
The topics of debate at TICAD I were political and economic reform,
development of the private sector, regional cooperation and integra
tion, international cooperation, and the 'Asian experience and African
development'. Of these five themes, the new topic was 'Asian experi
ence and African development'. Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi
said, 'In our thinking, we believe that Asian experiences and special
ized knowledge regarding development are useful for African develop
ment in the 21st Century'.
The key messages that were conveyed at this conference were that
the purpose of growth is to alleviate poverty and to promote African
participation in the global economy. The Tokyo Declaration on African
Development was adopted in order to achieve these goals. The
Declaration is about embarking on political and economic reforms in
the African region under the slogan of 'good governance'. Avenues for
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making use of Asian experiences in order to assist with African devel
opment were also pursued. The important factors that contributed to
noteworthy performance of East Asian economies were cited in this
declaration, including rational application of macroeconomic policies,
maintaining political stability, long-term investments in education, and
the development of human capital. The declaration was manifest in the
first Asia-Africa Forum (AAF), organised in Indonesia in 1994, which
sought to promote cooperation between Asia and Africa. (ACT 3003
Activity Report Writing Committee 2004, ACT 2003 Activity Towards
TICAD III 2003 )
The Asia-Africa Forum was started as part of the South-South coop
eration and tried to encourage direct dialogue and cooperation between
African and Asian policymakers. The intent was to jointly formulate
specific sectors where African development could potentially benefit
from Asian experiences. The Bandung Framework for Asia-Africa
Co-operation, which incorporates ongoing interaction between leaders
of these two regions, was adopted at the forum. Initiatives such as
development of human capital and formation of systems for that
purpose, improvement of productivity in the agricultural sector, and
obtaining the required capital for the development process were recom
mended. Regional level workshops were also held. One such work
shop was held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in July 1995, and another in
Yamoussoukro of the Ivory Coast, in July 1996. These workshops were
held to evaluate the results of TICAD I and verify the principles of the
overall TICAD process. In addition, the Second Asia-Africa Forum in
Bangkok, Thailand, was held in June 1997 in preparation for TICAD II,
and was designed to confirm the points agreed on at the first forum.
TICAD I was successful at least in that it made the international commu
nity aware that various African economic and social problems remained
fundamentally unresolved. (Ampiah 2007, 2011, Lee 2010, Miyagi
2001,2004)
(b) TICAD II
A preparatory meeting for TICAD II was held in Tokyo on 10-11
November 1997, and was attended by senior officials from 46 African
nations, 9 Asian nations, 13 donor nations, 6 international organisa
tions, and representatives of regional organisations. At this meeting.
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three main goals were discussed: verification of the Initiatives since
TICAD I, confirmation of the key themes of the Agenda for Action, and
the establishment of an Agenda for Action Preparatory Committee to
be proposed at TICAD II. Topics discussed at this Preparatory
Committee meeting also Included social Issues (eradication of poverty,
education, sanitation, gender, and population), farming and the envi
ronment, conflict resolution, development, and governance.
The Tokyo Agenda for Action was adopted at TICAD II In October
1998. The Issues discussed Included reducing poverty by speeding up
economic growth and sustained development, and the Integration of
African nations Into the global economy. More specifically, the Agenda
for Action pertained to the following three areas: (1) Social develop
ment (education, sanitation and population, and other measures to
assist people living In poverty), (2) Economic development (develop
ment of the private sector. Industrial development, agricultural develop
ment, and foreign debt), and (3) Building the foundations for develop
ment (good governance, conflict prevention and post-conflict develop
ment). The goal was set to cut the proportion of the population living In
extreme poverty to at least half of the current level by 2015 through
Implementation of the above measures.
The fact that education was the focus for 'human capital building'
stood out In the Tokyo Agenda for Action. This was due to an aware
ness that education that had been the key to accelerating growth and
delivering sustained poverty reduction In East Asian nations. The goal
was to have at least 80% of children receive a complete primary educa
tion by 2005, and to have universal primary education by 2015. It was
also hoped that by 2005, that the adult Illiteracy rate (particularly for
women) would be lowered to half Its level In 1990. The Agenda empha
sised leaving the Initiative for development up to the African nations. A
TICAD II review meeting was held In November 1999, and at the same
time the Asia-Africa Investment and Technology Promotion Centre
(AAITPC) (also known as the HIppalos Centre) was established In
order to Institutionalize the economic ties between the regions, and the
Africa-Asia Business Forum (AABF) was held. The former Is a project
that Is Implemented through contributions to Japan's UN Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) and this centre was established In
Malaysia. The latter Is supported by using the 'Human resources devel-
14
opment fund', which Japan contributes to the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). (ACT 3003 Activity Report Writing
Committee 2004, ACT 2003 Activity Towards TICAD III 2003)
(c) TICAD III
Two preparatory meetings were held in New York in June and
September 2001 leading up to TICAD III. At these meetings, 'African
ownership of development initiatives' was emphasised and senior
government officials were invited to attend from the nations promoting
NEPAD, namely. South Africa, Senegal, Nigeria, Algeria, and Egypt.
The addition of NEPAD to the TICAD process gave legitimacy to
Japan's initiatives.
In December 2001, a TICAD ministerial-level meeting was hosted
by Japan, the UN, the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), and the World
Bank. At this meeting, an exchange of opinions was conducted on
TICAD II and on the development plans drafted by the African nations.
Specifically, there was discussion of putting foundations in place for
development, investing in human capital, reducing poverty through
economic growth, South-South cooperation, regional cooperation, and
the principles for development. The Chair's statement emphasised
collaboration between NEPAD and TICAD.
A TICAD preparatory meeting was also held in New York, in July
2002, in Japan's representative office in the UN. At a senior govern
ment officials' meeting in Ethiopia, in March 2003, the high priority
themes were identified. From May to June, a meeting regarding
Southern African issues was held in Pretoria, South Africa, a meeting
regarding the East African and North African issues was held in Nairobi,
Kenya, and a meeting regarding West African issues was held in
Yaounde, Cameroon. The purpose of these meetings was to deepen
understanding of region-specific issues and to proceed with work in
various sectors according to the priorities in line with regional circum
stances. This series of regional summits indicated Japan's resolution to
respect African ownership of the development process. In July, an
Organisers' Steering Committee Meeting was held in London and, in
August, an international symposium of NGOs was held at the United
Nations University.
TICAD III was held in Tokyo from 29 September to 1 October 2003.
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At the conference, international community support for NEPAD was
mobilised, and a broad-ranging debate was conducted over the initia
tives of both Africa and the donor nations towards African development.
One objective that emerged was the specific aim of forming new part
nerships with Asian nations. On the first day of the conference, the
previous TICAD process was examined and a comprehensive approach
regarding the pressing issues was explored. On the second day, the
most serious problems, HIV/AIDS and unemployment, were discussed.
The importance of Asian-African regional cooperation was empha
sised, including technical assistance from Asian nations to African
nations, as well as the importance of trade and investment. There was
also a call for cooperation to prevent reoccurring conflicts.
Since the start of the TICAD process, Japan had contributed 12
billion dollars in economic aid to Africa and conducted training in various
fields for 10,000 African people. In addition, Japan sent 7,000 experts
to Sub-Saharan Africa for the purpose of development assistance.
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced that Japan would provide
Africa with a total of one billion dollars in grant aid over five years.
These grants were intended for education, supplying clean water, and
humanitarian aid for victims of HIV/AIDS.
Finally, the TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration' was announced,
delineating the direction for the TICAD process. At this time, the TICAD
III Chair's Summary' was released, which summarised the specific
priorities. The philosophy of 'human security' pursued by Japan was
incorporated into the 'TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration' confirming
its importance in African development. (Inoguchi 2005, ACT 3003
Activity Report Writing Committee 2004, ACT 2003 Activity Towards
TICAD III 2003)
(d) TICAD IV
A TICAD IV regional preparatory conference for Southeast African
nations was held in Lusaka, Zambia, in October of 2007, and a regional
preparatory conference for Northwest African nations was held in Tunis,
Tunisia, in November 2007. During this time, the TICAD IV Secretariat
was set up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. In addition, in
early January 2008, Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura visited Tanzania
and gave a speech entitled 'Partnership to Create a "Happy and Healthy
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Africa'" and Former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori gave a speech at the
10th AU General Assembly on the significance of TICAD IV.
TICADIV was held 28-30 May 2008, in Yokohama. Its basic message
was 'Aiming for a Happy and Healthy Africa - The Continent of Hope
and Opportunity'. Under this banner, direction for African development
was discussed with a focus on accelerating economic growth, estab
lishing human security, and dealing with environmental and climate
change issues. In attendance, there were 41 heads of government,
including Prime Ministers, representatives from 51 African nations, 34
development partners and Asian nations, and 74 international organi
sations and regional organisations, as well as representatives from the
private sector and civil society. There were over 3,000 attendees
making this the largest international conference in Japan's diplomatic
history.
Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, who served as overall
Chair of the conference, announced Japan's aid strategy to Africa: to
double Japanese ODA and to support the doubling of private invest
ment as well. Former Prime Minister Mori, who had served as the Chair
of TICAD III, served as MC of the conference.
The conference drafted three documents. The 'Yokohama
Declaration', indicated political will regarding the initiatives and direc
tion for future African development. Based on this declaration, the
'Yokohama Agenda for Action', indicated specific initiatives for the
future TICAD process. Finally, the 'TICAD Follow-up Mechanism',
intended to verify the status of implementation of the TICAD process.
Details of the discussions conducted at TICAD IV were compiled into
the 'TICAD Chair's Summary'. (Obayashi 2006, 2009)
TICAD IV acknowledge that political and economic progress that
had been achieved in Africa since TICAD III while also confirming the
need to intensify initiatives by the international community toward
further African development. The recent self-help efforts in Africa were
acknowledged and the direction of strengthening the cooperative rela
tionship between the AU and TICAD was indicated. However, Africa
was (and is) faced with a mountain of issues such as rapid population
growth, unemployment problems in farming villages and cities alike,
infectious diseases, and soaring food prices, necessitating a renewed
call for continued focus. TICAD IV confirmed that in order to solve prob-
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lems such as these, economic growth needed to be accelerated by
promoting industrial and agricultural development, trade and invest
ment, and human resource development. Additionally, the conference
recognized the need to address the Millennium Development Goals
relating to the socio-economic aspects of human security, the entrench
ment of peace and establishment of good governance, and issues
relating to the environment and climate change. Partnerships needed
to be further broadened, collaboration with existing initiatives attempted,
and proactive participation in civil society would be required. (Lumumba-
Kasongo 2010 , Mangala 2010, Yamada 2011)
4. Prospects for Africa-Japan Relations in the New Century
(1) Africa as the Front Line of Japanese Diplomacy
One of the elements that make up the historical background of the
relationship between Japan and the nations of sub-Saharan Africa is
the spirit of the 1955 Asia-Africa (Bandung) Conference. This confer
ence covered the desire to pursue independence from colonialism, to
be neutral during the Cold War period (non-aligned movement), and to
develop economic cooperation and technical assistance between the
attending nations. Japan, as the only industrial nation present, was
eager to provide the necessary technology for the economic develop
ment of the newly emerging nations of Southeast Asia and in exchange
obtain the rights to access their raw materials and markets. This might
also mean open access to African materials and markets, as Africa was
beginning to show signs of independence. Japanese initiatives through
TICAD can probably be seen as an extension of the commitments
made at the Bandung Conference in 1955.
Japan's attitude toward Africa during the Cold War period was one
of caution. In a period of international political and economic change,
the wisdom of dealing with Africa at all was called into question. For
example, after the 1973 Oil Shock, Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura
chose to visit the African continent, urging Japan to establish politically
friendly relations for economic reasons. Although it was dangerous
diplomatically, Japan was then able to weather the impact of expanded
trade relations with South Africa through negotiations.
New developments in international politics, such as the demise of
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the apartheid regime in South Africa, followed by the collapse of the
Soviet Union, added a new dimension to Japan's relationships with
African nations. AtTICAD I, Prime Minister Morlhiro Hosokawa declared,
'Japan will continue to proactlvely support Africa's political and economic
reforms' and, 'Since the end of WWII, Japan has benefited greatly from
the generous support extended by the International community. Now Is
the time for Japan to repay that goodwill by playing a proactive role In
assisting Africa'. TICAD marked the start of a new phase In African-
Japanese relations and Indicated a change In Japan's attitude to the
'Africa problem'.
Prime Minister Mori's visit to sub-Saharan African nations In January
2001 marked a turning point In African-Japanese relations. During his
visit to Africa, Prime Minister Mori gave a speech entitled 'Africa and
Japan In the New Century' and declared that finding solutions to Africa's
problems was a high priority on the Japanese foreign policy agenda.
Not only did Prime Minister Koizumi announce 'Collaboration between
Japan and Africa - Specific Actions' to the African diplomatic corps
stationed In Tokyo In June 2002, he also made the keynote speech at
TICAD III In 2003. When he visited Addis Ababa In May 2006, Prime
Minister Koizumi, In a speech entitled 'Africa becoming the Birthplace
of Self-help Efforts', outlined Japan's diplomacy with Africa. He
announced specific assistance measures and detailed the areas In
which Japan should cooperate with Africa for achieving International
peace and stability. It was envisaged that the relationship between
Japan and the African continent required either the Prime Minister or
the Foreign Minister to visit at least once a year. Africa became the
'front line' of Japanese diplomacy.
TICAD IV was held In Yokohama In May 2008. The conference was
covered by 1,300 journalists of whom 1,000 were domestic and 300
were International. Despite the fact that this conference drew so much
attention. It seems that, since 2006, Japanese diplomacy with Africa
has lacked something of Its previous vigour. That Is because, since
2006, the conditions that made TICAD diplomacy possible In the past
have been gradually diminishing.
One such condition Is Japan's economic position In the world. At the
turn of the 21st Century, Japan was no longer an economic super
power, and In some aspects had also ceased to be the dominant
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economy in Asia. As of 2001, Japan's ODA had lost its standing as the
top source of aid to Africa. Japan was no longer a key creditor either.
Consequently, it became impossible to mention the 'Pax Nipponica'
with a straight face anymore. This was symbolized by the article titled,
'Japan is Fading', which ran in the 24 August 2009 edition of Newsweek.
Japan's diminishing role in Africa is also suggested by the fact that
not one of the Prime Ministers who have taken over from Prime Minister
Koizumi in 2005 has visited Africa. Even Prime Minister Tare Aso, who
has experience working in Africa in the past, did not have enough time
to visit Africa. Given that Prime Minister Aso and those who succeeded
him had such short terms in office, this is understandable. Even so, it
seems that Japan's African diplomacy is moving into a post-TICAD
stage and losing its dynamism as a result. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA), website http://www/mofa.go.jp/ 24 November 2012)
(2) TICAD IV Follow Up and Looking Toward TICAD V
TICAD IV compiled specific assistance measures for Africa into the
Yokohama Agenda for Action. At the same time, the TICAD Follow-up
Mechanism was established to monitor the status of the assistance
measures announced through the TICAD process. This mechanism
consists of three layers. The first is the Secretariat, which was estab
lished under the Director General, African Affairs Department, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Japan. The purpose of the Secretariat is to gather
and analyse information in conjunction with the related government
organisations regarding the status of TICAD priority areas, as well as
carrying out PR activities. The second is the Joint Monitoring Committee
of the TICAD Process. This committee puts together an annual prog
ress report and a committee meeting is held once a year. Third is the
TICAD Follow-up Meeting. This ministerial-level meeting is held once a
year to verify and evaluate TICAD-related activities based on the annual
progress report.
A meeting of the Joint Monitoring Committee of the TICAD Process
was held on 9 February 2009. The meeting was chaired by Yoshitaka
Akimoto, Director-General, African Affairs Department, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan. Participants included relevant government
agencies and organisations, TICAD organisers (UN, UNDP, World
Bank), the AU Committee, the African diplomatic corps stationed in
20
Tokyo, and the donor nations. The meeting verified the state of prog
ress regarding assistance measures to Africa. On 11 March that same
year, the TICAD Follow-up Symposium-Japan's Efforts to Promote
Peace and Stability in Africa: the Case of Sudan and Beyond' was held
at the United Nations University. This symposium commenced with
Luka Biong Deng, Minister of Presidential Affairs in the Office of the
President, Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) reading the speech
of the First Vice President. This was followed by an exchange of opin
ions between experts from home and abroad on the topics of The
current state of the peace process between North and South Sudan
and Japan's assistance in Sudan' and The importance of enhancing
the peacekeeping capabilities of African countries and Japan's
assistance'.
Additionally, the inaugural TICAD Ministerial Follow-up Meeting was
held in Botswana on 21-22 March 2009. At this meeting. Foreign
Minister Hirofumi Nakasone announced assistance to progress the
Yokohama Agenda for Action (two billion dollars in grant aid/technical
cooperation, three-hundred million dollars in food/humanitarian assis
tance, and two-hundred million dollars to fight infectious diseases) and
to implement the commitments made at TICAD IV. The second meeting
was held InArusha, Tanzania, on 2-3 May 2010. At this meeting. Foreign
Minister Katsuya Okada served as co-chair together with theTanzanian
Finance and Economic Affairs Minister Mustafa Mkulo. Foreign Minister
Okada declared the new government's resolve to implement the TICAD
IV commitments and indicated that Japan would work on certain initia
tives in the future. These included extending assistance with three proj
ects designed to enhance cooperation with Africa: two billion dollars in
loans over two years for infrastructure projects designed to boost
African recovery from the economic crisis, one billion dollars in support
of maternal and child health in order to achieve the MDGs, and support
based on the 'Hatoyama Initiative' to deal with climate change. The
third meeting was held in Dakar, Senegal, on 1-2 May 2011. The
meeting was attended by Japanese Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto
and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Chiaki Takahashi. Foreign
Minister Matsumoto co-chaired the meeting with Minister of Foreign
Affairs Madick^ Niang. Foreign Minister Matsumoto expressed Japan's
appreciation for all of the support that had been rendered to Japan by
21
African nations and the International community In the wake of the
Great East Japan Earthquake. He declared Japan's determination to
faithfully Implement the TICAD IV commitments In order to actively
promote peace and stability In the International community. The Foreign
Minister also announced that In order to contribute to African economic
growth, the sectors and countries eligible for loan projects would be
handled flexibly and that the granting of new loans would be sped up.
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs TakahashI proposed that TICAD
deal with the changes occurring In Africa and the Middle East from a
'human security' perspective, calling for cooperation between Japan
and the nations of Africa In promoting UN Security Council (UNSC)
reforms. This would Include striving for close cooperation towards
COP17, convening In South Africa, and formulating a strategy for low-
carbon growth and sustainable development In Africa.
At TICAD IV, Prime Minister Fukuda had announced the formation
of Joint missions to promote trade and Investments In Africa. The joint
missions, made up of representatives from the Japanese business
community, political circles, relevant government ministries, and agen
cies, would be put together to visit the Southern, Eastern, and Western
regions of Africa. Their purpose would be gathering Information,
networking, and unearthing potential trade and Investment projects.
They would achieve this by having meetings with key leading figures In
each country, exchanging opinions with the local chambers of commerce
and Industry as well as corporate representatives, visiting various facili
ties, etc. It was expected that dispatching these missions would further
expand trade and Investment between Japan and Africa, contribute to
accelerating economic growth In Africa, and be useful In promoting
Japan's resource diplomacy. Since 2008, several joint missions have
been sent to various nations across Africa. In September 2008, the
Joint Mission for Promoting Trade and Investment In East Africa was
led by Parliamentary VIce-Mlnlster for Foreign Affairs Nobuhlde
MInorlkawa. This was followed by a string of missions led by
Parliamentary VIce-Mlnlster for Foreign Affairs YasutoshI NIshlmura:
the Joint Mission for Promoting Trade and Investment In Central and
West Africa, the Joint Mission for Promoting Trade and Investment In
Southern Africa, and the Joint Mission for Promoting Trade and
Investment In East Africa. In October 2008, the Joint Mission for
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Promoting Trade and Investment in Central and West Africa was
dispatched. In September 2010, the Joint Government-Private Sector
Southern African Trade and Investment Mission was dispatched, and in
October 2011, the Joint Government-Private Sector African Trade and
Investment Mission visited Sudan, South Sudan, and Kenya.
The fourth TICAD Ministerial Follow-up Meeting was held in
Marrakesh, Morocco, on 5-6 May 2012. At this meeting, the state of
progress on the Yokohama Agenda for Action was examined, and
discussions were held in preparation for TICAD V, which is scheduled
for 1-3 June 2013. The attendees outlined the current state of African
development and discussed the key themes for TICAD V, as well as the
format and approach. The attendees recognized that TICAD V should
work towards achieving comprehensive and sustainable growth as well
as towards building strong societies in Africa. A senior working group
level meeting was scheduled for autumn 2012, to be held in Burkina
Faso, and a ministerial level preparatory meeting was proposed for the
first quarter of 2013, to be held in Ethiopia. Prior to this, a meeting of
African Ambassadors was held from 14-15 December 2011, at which
opinions were exchanged regarding TICAD V and regional situations in
Africa. On 21 March 2012, the TICAD V Secretariat was set up within
the organization under the Director General, African Affairs Department,
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. The secretariat had begun
the overall work of setting up and running TICAD V to be held in
Yokohama. Moreover, on 12 June the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan and NGOs held their first meeting to exchange ideas regarding
TICAD V, and on 2 August, the first government-private sector coop
erative conference on the promotion of TICAD V was held. At this
conference, there was joint recognition that, while there were business
opportunities for Japanese companies in Africa, it would be necessary
to invest in industries that would increase in value and add to human
resource development in order to promote African business.
Since December 2008, Japan, China, and South Korea have held
annual, trilateral consultations on African policy. The fourth consultation
fell on 7 December 2011, and took place in Tokyo. At this meeting, the
three nations exchanged opinions on their general and economic poli
cies in Africa, as well as political information on Sudan and the Horn of
Africa. They discussed initiatives designed to enhance political and
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economic relationships with Africa as well as cooperation with the AU
and with African regional organisations, as well as each of the three
countries' frameworks for cooperation with Africa (TICAD V, 2013, the
fifth Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 2012, and the Third
South Korea-Africa Forum (KAFs), 2012, respectively). Japan explained
its policy of proactively supporting Africa in expanding development
aid, trade, and investment; contributing to peace and stability; and
dealing with global issues.
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), website http://www/mofa.go.jp/
24 November 2012)
(3) Japan and China in Africa
Japan's African diplomacy has been conducted recently amidst a
backdrop of heightened Chinese activity on the African continent. In
2005, China overtook Japan and became the second largest importer
of African-produced oil. In 2007, Chinese trade with Africa reached
roughly three times that of Japan. China has become one of the major
trading partners of many countries in Africa, from Angola to Burundi,
from Cameroon to the Central African Republic and Chad.
Compared to Japan, China has few restrictions on its actions in
Africa. For instance, China will buy what it intends to, heedless of
potential consequences or whether their actions antagonise Western
nations. Of course, Japan and China are not rivals in the same sense
that China and the United States are rivals. What's more, Japan and
China are not as yet equal with each other in terms of economic
strength. From an economic perspective, for China and Japan, the
relationship with Africa may not be as important as the relationship with
the neighbouring countries of the United States and Europe. (Raine
2009)
China is attracting a lot of attention from African politicians. This is
not surprising when one considers that China, compared to Japan, is
expressing the intention to strengthen all political and economic ties
with African nations. Moreover, Africa-China relations have a deeper
history compared to Africa-Japan relations. China's major involvement
in Africa has given new stimulus to Japan's diplomacy in Africa. A
number of aspects of Japan's diplomacy in Africa may be, in part, in
response to China's heightened presence in Africa. The Japanese
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government was relieved that TICAD IV held In Yokohama, in May
2008, had a comparable number of African leader attendees to that of
FOCAC, held two years prior in Shanghai. (Taylor 2009, 2011)
Japan's ODA White Paper (2007 edition) states the following in rela
tion to Africa: 'Japan is considering plans to advance infrastructure
development in Africa and these include, for example, construction of
extensive road networks'. The same message was also present in the
2008 edition: 'Development of regional infrastructure focused on roads
and power networks is vital in order to stimulate the acceleration of
growth in Africa'. As a result of increased Chinese activity on the African
continent, the Japanese government expects a range of business
communities to become even more proactive in various sectors. (JICA
2007)
However, the differences in Japan and China's foreign policy
approaches to Africa should not be exaggerated. If anything, Japan
has created African development plans with a focus on cooperation
with international organisations and with other developed nations.
Specifically, in regards to TICAD IV, Japan has consulted not just with
multilateral organisations, but also donor nations and aid agencies in
order to achieve the results of the Yokohama Declaration. Even the
TICAD II declaration of 1998 stated that African nations would probably
agree to and implement economic reforms or structural reform programs
supported by the Bretton Woods system. The fact that the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank were
key organizers of TICAD I is broadly remembered.
It is worth pointing out that Japan and China's diplomatic approaches
on Africa differ on the following points. First, China does not view the
Bretton Woods system as having much legitimacy. That is because
China has doubts about the process by which the system was made -
by whom and for whom it was made. This is not the case for Japan.
Japanese activity in Africa has been constrained by the national interest
and by its intention to remain an important member of the so-called
Western block. In spite of these facts, or because of these facts, two
aspects have appeared in Japan's foreign policy on Africa: the ongoing
aspects and the changing aspects.
As the only non-European nation that has succeeded in industrial
ising, and as a sympathetic supporter that pro-actively participated
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from the outset in the Africa-Asia group, it is natural that Japan has
been regarded by the post-Colonial nations of Africa not only as a refer
ence country but also as a development partner. However, at times,
Japan's motives in seeking economic security and international legiti
macy in an US-Europe centric world, have, by necessity, taken a
different course from that desired by many African nations. Until
recently, Japan was not only the first non-European nation to success
fully industrialise, but also the first non-European economic super
power. The fact that Japan has had a close alliance with the West in the
post-WWII period is also reflected in its policy on Africa.
While the rise of China has added a new member to the non-Euro
pean nations who have successfully industrialised, in some aspects, its
ideology is out of sync with those of Japan and the West. Whether this
fact should be welcomed or denigrated depends on each party's
perspective according to where they stand.
Controversy is also arising in Africa regarding China's emergence.
This is because opinion is divided amongst the African nations as to
whether China is starting to emerge as a new colonial power, or whether
it is a true partner for African development. While the degree differs,
similar doubts arose in the past regarding the relationship between
Africa and Japan. By observing this retrospective on the past half
century of Japanese foreign policy on Africa, one might infer that what
preordains the results of interrelationships between countries is not so
much the intentions of the nations, but rather the degree to which their
interests coincide. (Adem 2006, Harneit-Sievers, Axel and Naido 2010,
Cornelissen, Chru and Shaw 2012)
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